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Abstract
To ensure proper functioning of a Wireless Sensor Net-
work (WSN), it is crucial that the network is able to de-
tect anomalies in communication quality (e.g., RSSI), which
may cause performance degradation, so that the network can
react accordingly. In this paper, we introduce RADIUS, a
lightweight system for the purpose. The design of RADIUS
is aimed at minimizing the detection error (caused by nor-
mal randomness of RSSI) in discriminating good links from
weak links and at reaching high detection accuracy under
diverse link conditions and dynamic environment changes.
Central to the design is a threshold-based decision approach
that has its foundation on the Bayes decision theory. In
RADIUS, various techniques are developed to address chal-
lenges inherent in applying this approach. In addition,
through extensive experiments, proper configuration of the
parameters involved in these techniques is identified for an
indoor environment. In a prototype implementation of the
RADIUS system deployed in an indoor testbed, the results
show that RADIUS is accurate in detecting anomalous link
quality degradation for all links across the network, main-
taining a stable error rate of 6.13% on average.
1 Introduction
The performance of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
often deteriorates after in-situ deployment of the network
[9, 13, 23, 26]. Link quality degradation, due to, e.g., fading
and interference, is one of the major reported causes behind
such behavior, which may be significant enough to impact
the link’s performance, e.g., the packet delivery ratio. De-
tecting such anomalous degradation in link quality is crucial
for an operational WSN to decide possible remedy actions
such as tuning stack parameters [3, 8]. In such way, the net-
work can continuously maintain its performance and satisfy
the user’s requirements.
In resource constrained WSNs, detecting anomalous link
quality degradation requires lightweight solutions with low
overheads in using memory, computation and communica-
tion resources. Resource-hungry centralized monitoring sys-
tems [4, 13, 21] and/or machine learning-based detection
techniques [10,19,20] are hence hardly applicable to WSNs,
due to large communication and/or computation overheads.
In addition, a solution should be accurate with a low error
rate (false positive/negative rate) and be robust with con-
sistent performance under diverse link conditions and dy-
namic environment changes. However, in WSNs, due to the
stochastic nature of link quality metrics, e.g., received sig-
nal strength indicator (RSSI) [2], it is challenging to distin-
guish between true link quality degradation and normal ran-
domness. Data smoothing [5] may only mitigate the prob-
lem. CDF-based [5, 24] and Chebyshev inequality-based
[11, 15, 29] statistical techniques are lightweight and seem
to be effective in making the distinguishing. However, our
investigation, as to be shown later in this paper, reveals that
it is difficult to optimize them to achieve both high detec-
tion accuracy and robustness for links which may experience
diverse link conditions and dynamic environment changes.
To meet these requirements, i.e., lightweight, accurate
and robust, we have designed a system for detecting anoma-
lous link quality degradation, called RADIUS. In addition
to being lightweight, its design has also been aimed at min-
imizing the detection error (caused by normal randomness
of RSSI) in discriminating good links from weak links and
at being robust in maintaining the detection performance
for different links and under dynamic environment changes.
Central to the design is a threshold-based decision approach
(for being lightweight) that has its foundation on the Bayes
decision theory (for being accurate and robust).
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has investi-
gated the applicability of Bayesian thresholding in detecting
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anomalous link quality degradation in WSNs. A possible
reason is perhaps due to the various challenges inherent in
applying the approach. To address these challenges, vari-
ous techniques have been developed to identify the number
of RSSI samples needed to achieve a “good” approximation
of the mean and the standard deviation, to update the mean
and standard deviation estimates, and to choose and update a
“proper” setting for the a priori probability, where the mean,
the standard deviation and the a priori probability are the
three fundamental variables used in the Bayes formula.
A prototype of the RADIUS system has been imple-
mented and deployed in an indoor testbed. For proper config-
uration of the parameters involved in the various techniques
in RADIUS, suggestions on their settings are given based
on extensive experiments. In addition, we found that high
detection accuracy can be achieved by RADIUS under di-
verse link conditions more robustly as compared to the CDF
and Chebyshev thresholding techniques. Moreover, the over-
head analysis and the detection results show that RADIUS
not only has low overheads in memory, communication and
computation, but also is accurate in detecting link quality
anomalies for all links across the network, maintaining a sta-
ble error rate of 6.13% on average. These are an indication
of RADIUS in fulfilling the requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the related work. Section 3 presents the system
design and motivates the adoption of Bayesian threshold-
ing. Section 4 introduces the key techniques used in RA-
DIUS. Section 5 analyzes the effect of the various involved
parameters in these RADIUS techniques on the detection
performance. Section 6 reports the details of our implemen-
tation, the corresponding system overheads and the overall
performance evaluation in an operational system on an in-
door testbed. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Anomalous link quality degradation is a major cause of
high packet losses in WSNs, reported by previous deploy-
ments [9,13,23,26]. Among various link quality metrics [1],
RSSI provides direct channel quality information at the re-
ceiver, which is typically a required input for remedy sys-
tems in order to tune stack parameters such as transmission
power [8] or other layer parameters [3, 30]. Many studies
[3,7] analyzed the relation between RSSI and packet loss and
studied the temporal properties of RSSI [2]. Only very few
works have investigated how to use RSSI readings to detect
good links (with low packet losses) turning into weak links
(with high packet losses) with optimal performance, i.e., ro-
bust detection with minimal detection error. Our work is
related to previous research on two topics: (1) network mon-
itoring approaches for detecting link-related failures, and (2)
anomaly detection techniques developed for WSNs.
Existing approaches of network monitoring and diag-
nosis generally rely on active collection of node and net-
work status. Some of them are centralized approaches, e.g.,
Sympathy [21] and Emstar [4], in which a large amount
of status information from individual sensor nodes (e.g.,
packet counter) is delivered to the sink to determine the fail-
ure causes. Agnostic Diagnosis [13] constructs correlation
graphs at the back-end server from collected system metrics
to detect link failures. Other approaches, e.g., self-diagnosis
[9], avoid sending all information to the sink by encouraging
multiple sensor nodes to exchange information for coopera-
tive failure detection. All these systems are powerful at de-
tecting various failure types. However, they introduce large
communication overhead to energy-constrained WSNs. Be-
sides, most of these systems use metrics like packet counter
or retransmission counter. Though such metrics enable easy
detection of packet losses, they can hardly be used to de-
termine the cause, e.g., whether a loss is due to bad chan-
nel condition or packet collision. Instead, RADIUS utilizes
RSSI, a channel quality attribute resident within every re-
ceived packet, which does not require active information col-
lection, allowing fully distributed anomaly detection.
The research on anomaly detection in wired and wireless
ad hoc networks is quite mature, but only a few solutions
can be directly applied to WSNs due to the limited mem-
ory and computational capability of sensor nodes. Data min-
ing and computational intelligence-based techniques, such as
clustering [20], support vector machine [19] and neural net-
works [27], own strong detection generality and accuracy as
long as adequate attributes are in use [28]. However, they all
come with high complexity. In addition, they often rely on
a central entity to cope with heavy tasks. PAD [10] deduces
link level errors with a probabilistic inference model main-
tained at a server. Statistical techniques such as kernel den-
sity estimator also require high computational capability to
generate the density estimator. A recent work of employing
such techniques is RASID [5], implementing the system on
more powerful devices (WiFi access points) to detect intrud-
ers. Due to the limited resources of sensor nodes, data min-
ing or machine learning oriented approaches are normally in-
feasible for distributed anomaly detection systems in WSNs.
The most widely used anomaly detection technique in
WSNs is the statistical measure-based technique (e.g. mean,
variance, maximum, self-defined) due to its low complexity
and high effectiveness of finding detection boundaries (i.e.
thresholds). For example, Fine-grained Analysis [25] de-
tects security attacks when RSSI changes exceed the mea-
sured maximum fluctuation occurred during the initial train-
ing phase. In the statistical measure category, there are
two often used techniques: (1) CDF-based thresholding (or
percentile-based thresholding), and (2) Chebyshev inequal-
ity-based thresholding. In CDF-based schemes, the thresh-
old is defined as the x-th percentile of the underlying data
distribution of the monitored attribute. An example is the
Memento system [24] where an empirical CDF of consec-
utively missing heartbeat numbers is used to detect sensor
failures. Another example is RASID [5] which also defines a
threshold at a given percentile after the density function is es-
timated. In other cases, when the underlying probability dis-
tribution of the monitored attribute is not known a priori, the
Chebyshev thresholding technique has often been applied.
For instance, Chebyshev thresholding is used in [11] to trou-
bleshoot the network performance issues. In [29], a fusion
threshold bound is derived using the Chebyshev inequality
for target detection in WSNs.
Despite their low complexity and easy adaptation to
WSNs, both CDF-based and Chebyshev inequality-based
methods are not designed for optimizing detection accuracy.
In addition, achieving robust performance in detection ac-
curacy by them is also a challenge. Later in this paper, we
show that employing these two methods to achieve best de-
tection accuracy implicitly requires manual fine-tuning of the
threshold parameters for each monitored link, which is dif-
ficult to do in practice. In RADIUS, we employ the Bayes
decision theory [12] to minimize the detection error, which
is also a thresholding technique and has been widely used
in other fields, e.g., signal detection and image analysis.
Specifically, we apply the Bayesian thresholding technique
to identify good links and weak links based on the monitored
RSSI values. Its complexity is similar to that of the CDF or
Chebyshev thresholding technique. Additionally, we com-
bine the Bayesian thresholding technique with several sup-
porting techniques to build a robust and accurate system for
detecting anomalous link quality degradation in WSNs.
3 The RADIUS System Design
In this section, we give an overview of the system design
and the architecture of RADIUS, followed by the introduc-
tion of its major functional modules. In addition, we moti-
vate the use of Bayesian thresholding in RADIUS to achieve
minimal error rate and high robustness in detecting link qual-
ity anomalies, based on a comparison with the CDF thresh-
olding and the Chebyshev thresholding techniques.
3.1 RADIUS System Overview
To achieve its goal, RADIUS adopts a hybrid approach.
It comprises a set of distributed software modules located at
the sensor nodes, which are called Detection Agents (DAs),
to detect anomalous link quality degradation along routing
paths. In addition, a central server, called Visualizer and
Control Center (VCC), is used to monitor the performance
of both the network and the RADIUS system. The overall
system architecture of RADIUS is shown in Figure 1.
Two phases. Similar to other anomaly detection sys-
tems, RADIUS runs in two phases: a training phase and an
anomaly detection phase. During the training phase, the user
first observes if the performance of the network, e.g., packet
delivery rate, is above the user requirement. In this case, each
DA measures and collects the RSSI readings of the received
packets to construct a “normal profile” for each monitored
link, based on which a set of thresholds are generated. In
the following anomaly detection phase, each DA compares
the runtime RSSI readings with the generated thresholds to
detect if there is an anomalous link quality degradation.
System modules. Choosing an appropriate anomaly de-
tection technique is the key to achieve high detection perfor-
mance, especially when using the highly varying RSSI val-
ues to distinguish the good links (with low packet losses)
from weak links (with high packet losses) as accurately
as possible. To tackle this problem, RADIUS employs a
thresholding technique based on the Bayes decision theory.
Through the process of deciding a Bayes threshold, the de-
tection error rate can be minimized, as to be discussed in
Section 4.1. In a (close to) Gaussian channel, the computa-
tion of the Bayes threshold for a desired error only relies on
a user-defined parameter (i.e. the a priori probability in the
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Figure 1: The RADIUS system design and its functional modules.
Bayes formula) and two statistical measures (i.e. the mean
and the standard deviation) of the measured RSSI values.
During the training phase, the Bayesian Thresholding
Module in each DA constructs the RSSI profiles (mean
and standard deviation) of good links, and at the end of
this phase, the module derives a Bayes threshold for each
monitored link. Note that, although the detection error is
minimized by employing the Bayesian thresholding tech-
nique, the detection error rate may still be high when
the mean and standard deviation estimates are not accu-
rate due to insufficient RSSI training samples. To allevi-
ate this problem, RADIUS employs a Training Set Size
Estimation Module before the threshold computation. In
this module, we use a confidence interval to estimate for
each link the number of minimal RSSI samples required to
produce a good approximation of the true underlying distri-
bution of the RSSI values and hence the mean and standard
deviation. This module ensures a “good enough” quality of
the first Bayes threshold while keeping an acceptable train-
ing set size to avoid an overly long training time.
After the above operations, the anomaly detection phase
starts. Recall that RADIUS is aimed to achieve high de-
tection accuracy for links under diverse link conditions and
be robust to environment changes. This is realized mainly
by the Basic Detection Module and the Training Set
Update Module. For the former, i.e. to achieve consistent
high detection accuracy for different links, the system should
avoid fine-tuning of the parameters involved in the threshold-
ing, which specifically means no tuning of the a priori prob-
ability for each individual link. For this purpose, the Basic
Detection Module compares the runtime RSSI measure-
ments after smoothing with the Bayes threshold to decide
about whether there is an anomalous link quality degradation
or not. Later in Section 5.1, we show that a near-optimal de-
tection accuracy is possible for all links across the network
by even a coarse choice of the a priori probability setting.
In addition, to cope with dynamic environment changes, the
Training Set Update Module is introduced, which up-
dates the RSSI training set continuously during the detection
phase in a memory-efficient way.
To further explore the potential of the a priori prob-
ability parameter in achieving or maintaining the high
detection accuracy, a feedback-based a priori probabil-
ity adaptation technique is introduced in RADIUS dur-
ing the anomaly detection phase through the A Priori
Probability Refinement Module. If the module in the
VCC observes that the error rate of RADIUS for a link in-
creases above a certain threshold, it then informs the Setter
at the DA to tune the setting of the a priori probability.
In summary, the DA on each sensor node monitors the
link quality of the links used by the higher-layer network
protocols and fire alarms to inform the VCC and the net-
work administrator about detected anomalous link quality
degradations. In the training phase, when the network per-
formance satisfies the user requirements, each DA generates
locally the best RSSI threshold using Bayesian thresholding
(Section 4.1) for each monitored link after collecting enough
samples as determined by the minimal training set size esti-
mation (Section 4.2). In the detection phase, using the gen-
erated thresholds, each DA performs local detection includ-
ing data smoothing (Section 4.3) and adaptively adjusts the
threshold either with local information updating the training
set (Section 4.4) or with the refinement of the a priori proba-
bility by the feedback from the VCC (Section 4.5) to achieve
high accuracy and robustness.
Remarks. In RADIUS, we have focused on using the
RSSI link attribute to detect anomalous link quality degra-
dation. However, its approach is not strictly limited to using
RSSI, which may be extended to use other communication
attributes as potential indicators of (possibly other types of)
network performance anomalies. For instance, packet CRC
error rate could be observed for identifying packet colli-
sions, packet overflow rate for indicating queuing losses, and
packet inter-arrival time for determining node crashes.
3.2 Motivation of Bayesian Thresholding
Before describing the details of the Bayesian threshold-
ing technique, we first motivate and illustrate its need. Its
ability to deal with the challenge of achieving minimized de-
tection error in a noisy channel is then evaluated in compar-
ison with the CDF-based (or Percentile-based) and Cheby-
shev inequality-based thresholding techniques.
3.2.1 Achieving Minimal Detection Error
Due to its stochastic nature, the quality of a WSN link
can vary randomly. To illustrate this, Figure 2 presents two
RSSI traces collected from a real WSN link. The upper one
is when the link operated in a normal state with a packet
delivery ratio (PDR) higher than 99% (i.e. good link), while
the lower one is when the link operated in an abnormal state
with PDR below 52% (i.e. weak link). The figure also shows
that the two clusters of RSSI values, although mostly centred
around their respective means, partially overlap with each
other and no threshold can clearly discriminate them. This
is due to the stochastic nature and the well-known temporal
properties of low-power wireless links [2].
An implication of Figure 2 is that no single RSSI thresh-
old can, based on an RSSI value, lead to a definite conclusion
without error if the link is in the good or weak state. Our ob-
jective is to find a threshold that minimizes the misidentifi-
cation error. As shown in the figure, finding such a threshold
involves a tradeoff decision to balance between reducing the
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Figure 2: The overlapping RSSI traces of a good link and a weak link
implies that achieving high detection accuracy requires to
minimize both the false positive and false negative rate.
chance that a good link is misidentified as a weak link and
reducing the chance that a weak link is falsely viewed as a
good link. The former is called false positive rate (FPR) and
the latter called false negative rate (FNR).
Mathematically, such a decision problem of finding the
best threshold minimizing the error rate has been compre-
hensively studied under the Bayesian decision theory. In ad-
dition, if the monitored attribute is a Gaussian random vari-
able (e.g., RSSI in a Gaussian channel), the complexity of
Bayesian thresholding decreases significantly, falling within
the limited capability of sensor nodes. This motivates our
adoption of Bayesian thresholding in RADIUS.
3.2.2 Comparison among Thresholding Techniques
To illustrate the high accuracy and robustness achieved
by a Bayesian thresholding based detection system, we com-
pare the detection performance of Bayesian thresholding
with that of two aforementioned popular statistical detection
techniques in WSNs: CDF-based and Chebyshev-inequality
based thresholding techniques, both of which have similar
complexity as the Bayesian thresholding technique.
In a CDF-based (or Percentile-based) detection scheme,
the threshold is typically defined as the x-th percentile of the
underlying data distribution of the monitored attribute. For
a Gaussian channel, the resulting threshold depends on the
mean and standard deviation of the collected RSSI samples
as well as on a parameter setting of the percentile defined by
the user. The other thresholding technique often used in the
literature of WSNs is the Chebyshev-inequality based tech-
nique. In this case, the threshold is defined as follows:
Tcheby = m+σm ∗
√
1−Ptarget
Ptarget
, (1)
where, in addition to the mean (m) and standard deviation
(σm) of the monitored attribute m, Ptarget is a user-defined
parameter for the desired false positive rate. Similarly, the
Bayes threshold for Gaussian random RSSI depends on the
same statistical measures (mean and standard deviation) as
the CDF and Chebyshev methods and hence incurs a simi-
larly low computation and memory overhead. The main dif-
ference is the parameter involved in the computation of the
Bayes threshold: the a priori probability of a link being in a
good state (P(Hg), as to be discussed in Section 4.1).
For this comparison, we evaluate the system performance
in terms of accuracy and robustness, with a focus on how
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Figure 3: The performance of CDF (Percentile) and Chebyshev thresholding varies dramatically depending on the parameter setting. Instead, the
performance of Bayesian thresholding is robust, providing near-optimal accuracy under different link conditions with a coarse P(Hg) setting.
the performance is influenced by the user-defined parame-
ters, namely the x-th percentile for CDF thresholding, Ptarget
for Chebyshev thresholding and P(Hg) for Bayesian thresh-
olding. The preferable technique is the one whose best detec-
tion accuracy performance is least sensitive to its parameter
choice. Ideally, such a technique does not require fine-tuning
of its parameter to achieve consistently optimal accuracy.
We apply these three techniques individually to the same
data traces collected from 5 different links in a network. The
links are selected in such a way that diverse link conditions
(e.g., line-of-sight, non-line-of-sight, no human movements
or frequent movement etc.) are captured. We record the
false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) for
each technique. A detection decision is considered as false
positive (false negative) when the technique declares that an
RSSI anomaly is detected (not detected) while the packet de-
livery rate over the link is above (under) a minimum (e.g.,
80%). The values of the above parameters of each method
are varied in the same wide range of [10−5, 1− 10−5]. The
resultant overall detection error rate (sum of FPR and FNR)
for the three methods are presented in Figure 3.
From Figure 3, we can clearly see that the system
performance with the Bayes threshold is consistently ro-
bust for different links and is insensitive to the value of
P(Hg) unless P(Hg) is approaching the extreme, i.e., 1. In
contrast, the system performance of both Percentile-based
and Chebyshev-based approaches dramatically varies with
changing parameter values. Furthermore, the optimal Ptarget
for Chebyshev threshold with minimal detection error varies
significantly from link to link. Instead, Bayesian threshold-
ing with a global coarse setting of P(Hg) (e.g., any value
from 0.1 to 0.9) for the analyzed 5 links provides close to the
minimal detection error achieved by the Chebyshev thresh-
olds. Finally, the accuracy with the Percentile threshold is in
general worse than that with the Bayes threshold for every
link with any parameter setting.
An implication is that while CDF thresholding tends to
provide tight RSSI bounds of good links for achieving a
low FNR, it can easily cause a significantly high FPR in
case of high randomness and temporal variations, making
the technique difficult to achieve a low error rate. In addi-
tion, while Chebyshev thresholding can reach high detection
accuracy, its performance highly depends on the choice of
Ptarget . Bayesian thresholding, on the other hand, is designed
to minimize the detection error while at the same time it can
use a single setting of the threshold parameter P(Hg) for the
entire network, thus avoiding parameter tuning for every in-
dividual link. Thanks to such features, we employ Bayesian
thresholding as the core detection technique in RADIUS. De-
tails of Bayesian thresholding and the supporting techniques
needed to use it are described in the following section.
4 The RADIUS Techniques
RADIUS aims to achieve robust and accurate detection
for maintaining the network performance by combining the
Bayesian thresholding with several supporting techniques.
In this section, we present the Bayesian thresholding tech-
nique, elaborate the supporting techniques and identify the
involved parameters.
4.1 Bayesian Thresholding
A classical example that employs Bayesian thresholding
is the binary detection problem, as known in the communi-
cation literature [6]. The goal is to detect binary digits “0”
and “1” in a noisy channel based on the received signal level
with the knowledge of the a priori probabilities of “0” and
“1”. Mapping such a problem to our problem of detecting
link quality degradation, our goal is to detect a link either
being a good link (with low packet losses) or a weak link
(with high packet losses) with a minimized error rate based
on the RSSI values measured at the receiver of the link.
Mathematic Basis. Let Hg and Hw respectively denote a
link being a good and a weak link. Let E denote a detec-
tion error (either a false positive or a false negative). Then,
based on the Bayes decision theory, P(E), the probability
of detection error, can be expressed in terms of conditional
probabilities as follows:
P(E) = P(E|Hg)P(Hg)+P(E|Hw)P(Hw), (2)
where P(Hg) is the a priori probability of a link being a good
link, and P(Hw) = 1− P(Hg). P(E|Hg) is the probability
of false positives, i.e., misidentifying a good link as a weak
link, while P(E|Hw) is the probability of false negatives, i.e.,
failing to detect a degradation in link quality.
We assume that the RSSI follows a normal distribution
N(µ,σ), which has been experimentally validated for low
power communication in WSNs [3, 22]. For simplicity, we
further assume that the distributions of RSSI for a weak link
and for a good link, while with different means µw and µg
respectively, have the same standard deviation σ. In other
words, the probability density functions of RSSI for the good
False 
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µw µg 
Figure 4: Illustration of the probabilities of error for a binary classifi-
cation problem with Gaussian distribution.
link fg(x) and for the weak link fw(x) are as follows:
fg(x) =
1√
2piσ
exp
{−(x−µg)2/2σ2} (3)
fw(x) =
1√
2piσ
exp
{−(x−µw)2/2σ2} (4)
An example of these density functions is plotted in Figure 4,
where the false positive rate and the false negative rate are
marked as shaded areas with respect to an RSSI threshold τ.
Based on Equations 3 and 4, the Bayes error P(E) can be
expressed as a function of the threshold τ:
PE(τ) =
∫ τ
−∞
fg(x)dx ·P(Hg)+
∫ ∞
τ
fw(x)dx ·P(Hw) (5)
We minimize P(E) by letting d
(
PE(τ)
)
/dτ= 0. We can
then obtain the optimal threshold TBayes that minimizes the
detection error and the resultant Bayes error PE as follows:
TBayes =
1
2
(µg +µw)+
σ2ln(P(Hw)/P(Hg))
µg−µw (6)
PE(α) = Q
[
α− 1
2
α−1ln
(
P(Hw)/P(Hg)
)]
P(Hg)
+Q
[
α+
1
2
α−1ln
(
P(Hw)/P(Hg)
)]
P(Hw) (7)
where Q(x) is a Q-function [18] and α is defined as:
α= (µg−µw)/2σ. (8)
Application to RADIUS. Applying the Bayesian thresh-
olding technique to RADIUS essentially requires to find the
Bayes threshold TBayes, as computed in Equation 6. The
use of Equation 6 also indicates that the computation of the
Bayes threshold only depends on a few statistical measures,
significantly reducing the complexity in comparison to typ-
ical Bayesian decision problems. These statistical measures
include the mean of the density distribution of RSSI for a
good link and for a weak link (µg and µw, respectively), as
well as the standard deviation σ of the distribution.
In the RADIUS system, the VCC monitors the end-to-end
packet delivery ratio (PDR) of the network after the network
is deployed. When the PDR satisfies the minimal user re-
quirements, implying that all links being used are good links,
the VCC informs all DAs to start the training phase. During
this phase, the statistical measures µg and σ are computed
from the collected RSSI samples for each individual link rel-
evant to the higher-layer routing protocols. For the value
of µw, we choose the border RSSI value of the “grey zone”
(i.e., µw =−88 dBm) reported in previous experimental stud-
ies [3,8], which show that PDR decreases significantly when
a link enters the “grey zone”.
The a priori probability P(Hg) required in Equation 6
is typically computed empirically based on previous expe-
rience or measurements. As this parameter has to be defined
before the deployment, the setting of P(Hg) impacts on the
detection performance of the operational system. In Section
3.2, we have presented its effect on the detection error in
general. In Section 5.1, we will quantify the effect of P(Hg)
on the FPR and the FNR in more details.
Bayesian thresholding alone is not enough. Despite that
the Bayes threshold is designed in RADIUS to minimize de-
tection error, it alone is not enough to build a robust and
accurate system for the detection of anomalous link quality
degradation in WSNs. There are several inherent challenges
that have to be addressed in order to apply the thresholding
technique. Some of them are introduced by the technique it-
self (e.g., accurate estimation of µg and σ) while the others
are caused by the fact that RSSI is highly influenced by envi-
ronment changes (e.g., smoothing and threshold adaptation).
In the rest of this section, we introduce these challenges and
the techniques that we employ in RADIUS to address them.
4.2 Estimating the Minimal Training Set Size
According to Equation 6, finding the Bayes threshold re-
quires to compute the mean µg and the standard deviation σ
from a collected RSSI training set. The size of such a train-
ing set has a significant impact on the estimation error of µg
and σ and hence a great impact on the system detection ac-
curacy. Deciding the training set size involves considering
a tradeoff between the detection accuracy and the training
latency. A larger training set can provide a more accurate
estimation of the underlying data distribution thus higher ac-
curacy in estimating µg and σ, while it may significantly in-
crease the training time. In addition, the training size should
also differ from link to link for the specific statistical charac-
teristics of individual links: small training set size may suf-
fice for a stable link while a larger size is required for links
with highly fluctuating RSSI readings.
To address this challenge, we analyze the confidence in-
terval to estimate the minimal training set size of RSSI val-
ues for each individual link. In this way, RADIUS achieves a
good tradeoff between system detection accuracy and train-
ing latency. After the training phase starts, the minimal train-
ing set size is decided by the DAs for each individual link
after the collection of a few RSSI samples.
In particular, each DA first computes the standard devia-
tion σs for the first Ns samples of RSSI collected in a short
time period. Then, the DA estimates the minimal training
set size Nts for a given error Eµ. According to the Central
Limit Theorem, for an attribute x with any type of underlying
distribution, the margin error of the confidence interval for
the attribute mean x¯ is eµ = z ·σp/√n, where z is the z-score
(z = 2.58 for a confidence level of 99%), n is the number of
samples and σp is the population standard deviation. With
this, the minimal training size Nts is calculated as:
Nts =
(
z ·σp
Eµ
)2
(9)
where Eµ is a user-defined parameter for the maximum error
of the estimated RSSI mean. In addition, σp can be substi-
tuted by the standard deviation σs of the first Ns samples,
which has to be larger than 30 [17].
Applying Equation 9 allows every DA to find appropriate
RSSI training set sizes for each of its observed links, achiev-
ing a good tradeoff between estimation accuracy and training
latency before computing the Bayes thresholds. Neverthe-
less, we need to find appropriate settings of Ns and Eµ to
apply Equation 9. In Section 5.2, we will show the impact
of Ns and Eµ on the training set size and subsequently on the
overall detection accuracy of RADIUS and then suggest the
parameter choices of Ns and Eµ for an indoor environment.
4.3 Data Smoothing
As illustrated by Figure 2, the RSSI signal is random in
nature. In other words, an RSSI value lower than the Bayes
threshold may actually be attributed to its normal random-
ness while not due to anomalous channel quality degrada-
tion. As a consequence, comparing each individual RSSI
value with the Bayes threshold TBayes and using the compar-
ison result to decide about an anomaly can lead to an over or
under estimation of anomalies.
To overcome this limitation and make RADIUS more ro-
bust, each DA applies a sliding window of size l to compute
a short-term average of RSSI and compares the l-averaged
RSSI with the Bayes threshold to trigger an anomaly de-
tection. Intuitively, the choice of l has an influence on the
detection accuracy. A smaller l makes the detection more
responsive, but it may not be sufficient to clean the noise.
On the other hand, a larger l may be a better choice for data
cleaning, but overly smoothing may fail to capture abnormal
events. To understand the impact of the sliding window size,
we show the effect of l on the system performance and sug-
gest a proper setting for indoor environments in Section 5.3.
4.4 Updating the Training Set
After the Bayes threshold is determined, RADIUS per-
forms anomaly detection on the monitored RSSI values by
comparing them against TBayes. While TBayes is designed to
minimize the detection error, the underlying RSSI distribu-
tion may vary due to environmental changes. Consequently,
the mean and standard deviation estimated in the training
phase may no longer be valid. This requires updating the
estimated RSSI distribution, as well as TBayes accordingly, in
response to environmental changes.
To cope with dynamic changes in the environment, we
update the mean and standard deviation of the RSSI distribu-
tion during the entire anomaly detection phase. The Bayes
threshold is then updated using Equation 6. Specifically,
we update the mean and standard deviation by updating the
training set with the normal RSSI readings observed during
the period of detection. To identify whether an RSSI value is
normal or not, RADIUS assigns an anomaly score at for it at
time t, indicating the significance of the anomalous behavior.
at is calculated by at = S¯/T , where S¯ is the sliding window
average of RSSI values and T is the Bayes threshold.
During the detection phase, RADIUS collects consecutive
RSSI readings in disjoint groups of size lupdate and also their
anomaly scores in a separate group to compute the average
anomaly score. The group of RSSI readings with an aver-
age anomaly score of less than one is added to the training
set. Through this, the training set is updated. This technique
is similar to the silence profile updating scheme in [5] for
intrusion detection. RADIUS, however, needs to keep sep-
arate groups to store anomaly scores because the threshold
may vary in the middle of an update process due to the a
priori probability refinement technique discussed in Section
4.5, while it remains constant in the scheme used in [5].
To minimize the memory overhead due to the update pro-
cess, we employ a memory-efficient way to update the RSSI
mean and standard deviation without incrementing the buffer
to store new RSSI samples. Details of its implementation
and memory overhead are described in Section 6.2. In addi-
tion, updating the training set requires a proper setting of the
parameter lupdate. In Section 5.4, we quantify the effect of
lupdate on the performance of RADIUS and recommend the
appropriate lupdate value for an indoor environment.
4.5 Refinement of the A Priori Probability
In addition to the RSSI mean and standard deviation that
are measured and updated as previously discussed, Equation
6 uses another parameter, P(Hg). This parameter is an empir-
ical, a priori probability decided before system deployment.
We showed earlier that the performance of RADIUS is not
sensitive to the setting of P(Hg). However, an initial coarse
setting of P(Hg), due to environment changes, may no longer
provide the best detection accuracy and hence become out-
dated, requiring a refinement.
To address this challenge, RADIUS refines the a priori
probability P(Hg) and then updates the Bayes threshold dur-
ing the detection phase when necessary. Specifically, when
an anomaly is detected and an alarm is triggered, the VCC
keeps recording the number of false alarms. An alarm is
considered as a false alarm if the PDR over the path of the
anomalous link, when the alarm is received at the VCC, re-
mains above a given threshold. RADIUS counts the number
of consecutive false alarms. When the number exceeds a pre-
defined value Nalarm, the VCC informs the specific DA and
the DA adjusts P(Hg), incrementing it by δ until reaching a
predefined maximum P(Hg). Here, we call δ the adjustment
step and maximum P(Hg) the allowed upper limit for the pa-
rameter to avoid over-adjustments that may lead to a signifi-
cant increase in FNR. Each time when P(Hg) is updated, the
Bayes threshold is updated accordingly. In Section 5.1, we
will analyze the effect of the initial and maximum setting of
P(Hg). In Section 5.5 we will discuss in details the effect
of Nalarm and δ on the performance of RADIUS and recom-
mend the appropriate settings for an indoor environment.
5 Setting the RADIUS Parameters
In the previous section, we presented the details of the
Bayesian thresholding and the supporting techniques in RA-
DIUS. We now study the impact of the aforementioned pa-
rameters required in each individual technique on the sys-
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tem performance. Specifically, we elaborate the effect of the
Bayes threshold parameter P(Hg) and then explore the pa-
rameter space of all the parameters involved in supporting
techniques. Based on detailed analysis, we give insights on
the best parameter setting for an indoor office environment.
For this, we performed extensive experiments, collect-
ing real data traces from an indoor testbed, whose details
are reported in Section 6.3. To capture different link con-
ditions, we selected 8 sender-receiver pairs (either line-of-
sight or non-line-of-sight) at different locations with various
environment dynamics (e.g., human movements and obsta-
cles). In each experiment, we simulated a good link turning
into a weak link by decreasing the transmission power of the
sender node from the maximum level gradually to the mini-
mum with a packet sending rate of 5 Hz. The receiver node
records the RSSI and PDR traces for more than 15 minutes.
We repeated the experiment 10 times for each link. The min-
imum PDR that decides whether a link is a good link or a
weak link is set to 80% throughout the whole analysis.
5.1 Bayesian Thresholding
According to Equation 6, calculating the Bayes thresh-
old requires a user-defined parameter: a priori probability
P(Hg). Different from the general analysis depicted in Sec-
tion 3.2, we present here the detailed analysis of the impacts
of P(Hg) on the false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate
(FNR) and the total error rate.
Figure 5 shows the change of the error rates with varying
P(Hg) ranging in [10−5, 1−10−5] for 5 representative links
out of the 8 analyzed links. We observe that the FPR always
decreases with P(Hg), while the FNR increases with P(Hg).
This is because a larger P(Hg) indicates a higher weight on
the FPR in the computation of the Bayes error (see Equation
7). Hence, reducing FPR is more effective than reducing
FNR to keep the Bayes error rate low for a larger P(Hg).
Moreover, we can see in Figure 5 that the overall error rate
mostly stays low regardless of the values of P(Hg), except
for the cases when the value of P(Hg) is extremely close to
0 or 1. The results confirm that the system performance with
the Bayes threshold is insensitive to the setting of P(Hg) as
long as extreme values are not considered. The reason for
this is that the Bayesian thresholding approach always tries
to balance between FPR and FNR for any P(Hg) setting.
From the figure, we can further see that a global P(Hg)
setting from a wide range (any value not close to 0 or 1) may
not be the best setting for each individual link. However, it
can provide for all different links near optimal detection ac-
curacy at the same time. In other words, with a coarse global
setting of P(Hg) for all DAs, the Bayesian thresholding en-
sures RADIUS to deliver near optimal accuracy for different
links under diverse link conditions without the need of tuning
for each of them. For our case, we select the initial setting of
P(Hg) at 0.8 because we assume that the probability of the
links being good is generally higher than that of being weak,
in our deployment environment. Additionally, to avoid the
significant increase of FNR caused by the over-adjustment
due to the a priori probability refinement, we limit the max-
imum P(Hg) to 0.99 for our deployment environment.
5.2 Estimating the Minimal Training Set Size
As discussed in Section 4.2, the first task of a DA before
generating a Bayes threshold is to estimate the minimal train-
ing set size Nts for each link. A proper Nts needs to achieve
a good tradeoff between detection accuracy and training la-
tency. To apply Equation 9, the computation of Nts requires
two parameters: (1) the number of first Ns samples of RSSI
for computing the standard deviation σs, and (2) the maxi-
mum error of the estimated mean Eµ. While the first Ns sam-
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Figure 8: Effect of data smoothing with different sliding window size l
for different P(Hg). Error rate is close to lowest when l = 3.
ples of RSSI only give a quick indication, Nts is the resul-
tant minimal training set size, from which the DA estimates
the RSSI mean and standard deviation for computing Bayes
thresholds. Nts is usually larger or at least equal to Ns.
We first study the impact of Ns. A small Ns may result in a
partial view of the complete channel variation, while overly
large Ns may only increase the training delay. To understand
the impact of Ns, we plot in Figure 6 the resultant standard
deviation σs for various values of Ns based on the RSSI traces
of all 8 links. We observe that the values of σs initially have
a larger variation and become more stable when Ns is close
to 250. The reason for this is that a small set of samples
is insufficient to capture the overall temporal variations of
RSSI, especially in an indoor environment where multi-path
fading and interference are ubiquitous. Based on the result,
we choose Ns = 250 for our indoor environment.
Then we focus on the impact of Eµ. According to Equa-
tion 9, the choice of Eµ has a tradeoff: smaller Eµ indicates
higher estimation accuracy of the RSSI mean and thus higher
detection accuracy; a smaller Eµ, however, may also increase
the training set size significantly. By varying the estimated
errors Eµ, we plot the resultant training set size and error
rates for 5 representative links in Figure 7. The figure shows
that the total error rate decreases significantly with a smaller
Eµ at the expense of a rapidly increasing training set size.
To balance between the detection error and the training time,
we choose Eµ = 1 dBm for our indoor environment, which
causes only a slight increase of the detection error compared
to that of Eµ = 0 dBm while at the same time keeping Nts
within the scale of a few hundred samples, achieving a good
tradeoff between the training latency (several minutes with a
sending frequency of 5 Hz) and detection accuracy.
5.3 Data Smoothing
As mentioned in Section 4.3, smoothing the noisy data
during the detection phase requires a sliding window of size
l to reduce the detection error caused by the normal RSSI
randomness. To see the impact of l, we demonstrate how
the error rate changes with different values of l (window size
from 1 to 15) under two representative P(Hg) values.
We observe from Figure 8 that, for both P(Hg) settings,
increasing l reduces FPR but increases FNR, which causes
the total error rate to first decrease and then increase with a
larger l. The reason is that smoothing RSSI is effective to
reduce false alarms. However, if l keeps increasing, at some
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point, the real RSSI anomaly events are smoothed out, caus-
ing a significant increase in FNR. The impact of l is also
related to the setting of the minimal PDR (PDRmin) that de-
fines a good link. In our case, as PDR is computed over a
sliding window of 10 packets and PDRmin is set to 80%, a
small sliding window l is preferred to avoid the significant
increase in FNR. For our case, we choose l = 3, at which the
total error rate is close to the lowest for both P(Hg) settings.
5.4 Updating the Training Set
To be adaptive to varying environment conditions, RA-
DIUS updates the training set as discussed in Section 4.4,
dynamically generating new thresholds. For this, the relevant
parameter is the update window size lupdate. We first show
that the detection performance is enhanced with this updat-
ing technique, and then we discuss the impact of lupdate.
In Figure 9(a), we present an RSSI trace with a valley of
RSSI values (between 300 and 500 seconds) indicating an
abnormal situation that causes the monitored PDR to fall be-
low the expected performance as shown in Figure 9(b). By
adapting the training set and consequently the threshold (see
Figure 9(c)), we can see from Figure 9(d) that in this ex-
periment, the detection error can be reduced of 3%-4% with
updated thresholds, down from 18% to 14% approximately.
Furthermore, we also observe from Figure 9(d) that the
impact of lupdate is not significant on the detection error (we
set lupdate to be 50 for our example deployment). However, a
larger lupdate may require a longer time to fill up the window
making the threshold update less responsive in some cases.
With such setting of lupdate, we observe the detection error
can be reduced of 3% to 8% in all experiments. Considering
that the total error rate in most of our experiments is less than
20%, such amount of reduction in the error rate is significant.
5.5 Refinement of the A Priori Probability
In addition to updating the training data set, one other
situation that requires to generate a new threshold is when
the detection accuracy degrades with an increasing number
of false alarms, indicating the need of updating the a pri-
ori probability. As described in Section 4.5, we consider the
maximum number of consecutive false alarms Nalarm and the
adjustment step δ of P(Hg). We quantify the effects of these
parameters in Figure 10, where we compare the detection ac-
curacy with and without the refinement of the a priori proba-
bility. Specifically, we show the detection performance with
varying Nalarm and δ. We use the suggested values in the
above sections for the other parameters.
From Figure 10, we can see that a smaller Nalarm can re-
duce FPR but it may also cause a significant increase in FNR
due to over-adjustment. On the other hand, a larger Nalarm
makes the system conservative on the a priori probability
refinement and hence the refinement less effective. The op-
timal choice of Nalarm falls at the location where the total
error rate is lowest. In addition, the choice of the parame-
ter δ needs to consider a tradeoff: larger δ indicates a more
effective adjustment but a higher risk of over-adjustment. In
our example, we choose Nalarm = 5 and δ= 0.003. With such
parameter settings, the analysis of all data traces shows that
based on the accuracy improvement achieved by the training
set updating technique, refining P(Hg) can further reduce the
error rate in a range from 2% to 5%.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
In the previous sections, we presented the RADIUS sys-
tem design and analyzed the impact of its parameters on the
detection performance. Based on these, we implemented the
DA component of RADIUS for TelosB sensor platforms and
the VCC for standard PCs. In this section, we detail our im-
plementation and discuss the system overhead. At last, we
show the evaluation results on the detection performance of
the overall implemented system in an indoor testbed.
6.1 System Implementation
In this section, we first describe the implementation de-
tails of the two major RADIUS components: the DA and the
VCC. We introduce the programming interface of the DA to
show that it is easy to use for higher-layer services and appli-
cations, followed by the implementation details of the VCC
and of the RADIUS IoT extension.
To ease the integration of RADIUS into higher-layer
applications, we implemented the DA component as a
module on TinyOS 2.1.2, which provides an interface
DetectionAgent (see Figure 11). The configureDA com-
mand is used to configure DA with user-specified param-
eter settings (e.g., the initial P(Hg)) as provided in con-
interface DetectionAgent {
command void configureDA(Struct_Param parameters);
command error_t start_Training();
command error_t stop_Training();
command error_t start_Detection();
command error_t stop_Detection();
command void update_RSSI(uint8_t rssi, uint8_t childId);
}
Figure 11: The programming interface for DA.
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Figure 12: The Monitoring User Interface of VCC.
figuration messages sent by the VCC. The interface also
provides control commands such as start Training or
start Detection for executing the different phases in RA-
DIUS. The command update RSSI is used to update the
RSSI distribution of each link during both the training and
the detection phases. With this programming interface, an
application only needs to react to VCC’s control messages
and call the different commands accordingly. Note that RA-
DIUS is not restricted to TelosB or TinyOS and can be easily
adapted to other embedded devices with low-power radios.
The component VCC, running on a standard PC, is im-
plemented in Java. It processes the alarms received from the
network and produces diagnosis results reporting the relevant
anomalies and their locations for the nodes that are experi-
encing high packet losses, which assists the system operator
in identifying possible remedy actions. The VCC also in-
cludes a Monitoring User Interface (see Figure 12), which
provides a visualization of the packet delivery performance,
detection status and the diagnosis results. Via this interface,
the operator can monitor and control the RADIUS system.
We have also extended the VCC with an Internet-of-
Things interface, which allows the VCC to connect with
openHAB [16], an open source smart home automation soft-
ware. MQTT [14], a lightweight messaging transport proto-
col, is used for the communication between openHAB and
the VCC. With this extension, the user can remotely control
the RADIUS system and monitor the detection results with
an Android smart phone, as depicted in Figure 13.
The current implementation of RADIUS is able to detect
anomalies in link quality. Nevertheless, the programming
interface (Figure 11) and the DA module can be easily ex-
tended to detect anomalies of other attributes, e.g., CRC error
rate or packet overflow rate. In addition, RADIUS currently
works for static tree-based data collection applications but it
can be also applied to other routing schemes.
Figure 13: The Android UI for RADIUS.
6.2 System Overheads
In this section, we analyze the memory, communication
and computation overheads of our RADIUS implementation.
Memory overhead. Detection Agents incur memory over-
head on RAM (data) and ROM (program) of sensor nodes.
As presented in Section 4.4, we keep updating the train-
ing set to adapt the mean µ and standard deviation σ of the
density distribution of RSSI. To avoid increasing RAM us-
age during the update, we implemented this in a memory-
friendly way, i.e., to compute µ and σ with a single pass
without storing the previous measurements of RSSI. To do
so, we reformulate µ and σ in the following way:
µ =
s
n
, σ=
√
1
n−1
(
q− s
2
n
)
(10)
where s and q are defined as follows:
s =
n
∑
i
xi, q =
n
∑
i
x2i (11)
in which xi is the i-th RSSI reading. Instead of storing the en-
tire training set, the DA then stores only 2 counters (s and q)
for each link to compute and update µ and σ. By doing so, the
RAM consumption of RADIUS has a complexity of O(mn),
where m is the number of links from direct child nodes and n
is the number of monitored attributes (e.g., RSSI, CRC error
rate), remaining independent from the sample number.
To evaluate the RAM and ROM overhead, we compare
the memory usage of a tree-based data collection application
with and without the DA module. In the application, each
node has two one-hop child nodes and therefore stores in-
formation about two links. The application alone consumes
3060 bytes in RAM and 25082 bytes in ROM while the ap-
plication including the DA module consumes 3176 bytes in
RAM and 31170 bytes in ROM. This indicates that the DA
module consumes 116 bytes RAM (in comparison to 10 KB
RAM in a TelosB device), and approximately 6 KB ROM (in
comparison to 48 KB ROM in a TelosB device).
Communication overhead. Due to its distributed archi-
tecture, the anomaly detection process alone incurs no com-
munication overhead in RADIUS. It requires additional com-
munication only if the DAs send alarms corresponding to de-
tected anomalies, or when the VCC sends control messages.
To reduce such overhead, the alarms with minimum informa-
tion (2 bytes) about the detected anomaly are piggybacked
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Figure 14: The indoor testbed.
Table 1: The system parameter settings used in the evaluation.
Techniques Parameters Settings
Bayesian initial P(Hg) 0.8
Thresholding maximum P(Hg) 0.99
Training Set Size sample number Ns to compute σs 250
Estimation max. estimated error of mean Eµ 1 dBm
Data Smoothing sliding window size l 3
Training Set Update update window size lupdate 50
A Priori Probability max. alarm number Nalarm 5
Refinement adjustment step δ 0.003
on the application packets. On the other hand, the number of
control messages delivered from the VCC to the DAs, based
on our indoor testbed evaluation results, is negligible com-
pared to the amount of received application packets.
Computation overhead. The main computation overhead
comes from the processing of the Bayesian thresholding. In
RADIUS, the complexity of Bayesian thresholding involves
the calculation of the mean, the standard deviation and the
Bayes threshold according to Equation 6. Testing results
show that the processing of a Bayes threshold takes about
10 ms, which is small compared to the normal packet inter-
arrival time in typical data collection applications.
6.3 Experimental Evaluation
We have evaluated the detection performance of our RA-
DIUS implementation in an indoor testbed (Figure 14) con-
sisting of 12 TelosB motes, deployed in several offices of a
university building. Each sensor node runs an application
that collects environmental data and sends it to the sink ev-
ery 2 seconds following a tree-based routing topology. We
instrumented a Detection Agent on each sensor node and ran
the VCC on a PC connected to the sink node (Base Station).
To configure the RADIUS system, we adopt the system
parameter settings suggested in the previous analysis (Sec-
tion 5). Table 1 summarizes the suggested parameter set-
tings. After a training period of about 5 minutes, RADIUS
starts the detection phase for a period of about 24 hours. Dur-
ing the experiment, we logged the received alarms, the RSSI
traces and the PDR traces. Figure 15 demonstrates our re-
sults of detecting link quality anomalies on one of the links.
From the PDR trace depicted in Figure 15(b), we can ob-
serve that the link frequently experienced high packet losses
during the first 4 hours and the last 3 hours due to the bad
channel quality caused by the students’ movements cross-
ing the communication link (see Figure 15(a)). The received
alarms that reported such anomalous link quality degradation
are marked in red in Figure 15(d). The results show a good
detection accuracy. The overall FNR and FPR of detecting
the anomalous RSSI degradation for this link over 24 hours
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Figure 15: Experimental results for link quality anomaly detection of
the link from node 11 to node 9. The experiment was run
for 24 hours, from 11:00 am till 11:00 am on the next day.
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Figure 16: The error rates for every link in the network (Figure 14).
are 5.1% and 4%, respectively.
In addition, we can see from Figure 15(e) that RADIUS
can keep the error rate stable over the detection period. Fig-
ure 15(c) clearly shows that the threshold is adaptive to RSSI
variations due to the environment changes. From our anal-
ysis based on the logged refinement points (marked in Fig-
ure 15(d)), RADIUS refines the a priori probability at around
13:00 on the first day and 10:00 on the next day to reduce
FPR and thus maintain the detection accuracy.
To demonstrate that RADIUS can robustly achieve high
detection accuracy for all the links across the entire deployed
network, we plot in Figure 16 the error rate for every link in
the testbed. The figure shows that with a set of global pa-
rameter settings (listed in Table 1), RADIUS achieves a low
error rate for every link in the network (6.13% on average).
7 Conclusion
This paper presents RADIUS, a system for detecting
anomalous link quality degradations in low-power radio
links. The RADIUS system is light-weight, accurate and ro-
bust to a diversity of link conditions and dynamic environ-
ment changes. To achieve this, RADIUS (1) lays its foun-
dation on a Bayesian thresholding scheme, integrated with
dedicated techniques for (2) minimal training set size esti-
mation, (3) sliding-window data smoothing, (4) distribution
self-adaptation, and (5) feedback-based threshold parame-
ter adaptation. The comparison with two popular statistical
approaches shows that RADIUS does not need fine-tuning
of its threshold parameter to achieve near-optimal accuracy
across the network. The impact of the system parameters is
also investigated in detail, identifying the best configuration
for an indoor environment. Moreover, we have implemented
the RADIUS system and evaluated its performance on an in-
door WSN testbed, showing that it can adapt to dynamic en-
vironment changes and achieve accurate detection over the
entire network with an average error rate of 6.13%.
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